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1. Introduction
The concern that politicians may divert public resources to specic groups for their own
electoral benet has generated substantial discussion both academically and in the public de-
bate. Voters have been shown to reward incumbents for spending, be it in the form of a specic
program targeted to individuals (like an anti-poverty cash transfer, see e.g. Manacorda, Miguel
and Vigorito 2011; Pop-Eleches and Pop-Eleches 2012; Baez et al. 2012), or public infrastructure
projects (such as a nation-wide road network as in Voigtlaender and Voth 2014). While this
literature convincingly shows that voters respond to spending in the polls, it is generally silent
on whether and how politicians allocate this spending across voters for electoral purposes.
There is pervasive evidence that national or regional level politicians favour local govern-
ments that are ruled by their own party in the allocation of transfers or investment projects
(e.g. Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro 2008; Bracco et al. 2015). However, this behaviour could
be the consequence of politicians trying to support other elected party members rather than a
strategic targeting of voters. In the absence of data at the intra-municipal (or individual) level,
distinguishing whether spending is meant to target voters for electoral reasons or to help the
local mayor is challenging.
In this paper we use nely disaggregated data to study whether politicians allocate spend-
ing in space in response to the spatial distribution of voters. In particular, we ask if investment
spending goes disproportionately to areas of strong support for the incumbent. For this pur-
pose, we use data from Plan E, a large stimulus program that, between 2009 and 2011, endowed
Spanish municipalities with 12 billion Euros to fund municipal investment projects, ranging
from sport facilities to provision of urban amenities. This program provides an excellent setting
to study distributive politics for several reasons. Firstly, municipal governments had substantial
discretion in the use of funds with respect to both the type and location of investment projects.
Given the urgency to implement this scal stimulus, the national government quickly processed
the applications for funding, approving in full over 99% of them (Montolio, 2016). Secondly, the
program had a substantial impact on municipal investment. Virtually all municipalities applied,
and the amount they received was three times as large as their infrastructures spending in an
average year. Finally, all Plan E investment projects were geo-located by the municipal author-
ities. These characteristics of Plan E allow us to exploit within-municipal variation in spending
to study distributional politics.1
Sub-national governments carry out two-thirds of all public investment in developed coun-
tries (OECD, 2013), yet distributive politics studies usually focus on national or, at most, re-
gional level decisions. For this reason, we have an incomplete understanding of whether the
welfare distortions that often have been associated with distributive politics (Weingast, Shepsle
and Johnsen, 1981) operate at the local level. To our knowledge, we are the rst to study the
geography of distributive politics inside cities. What enables us to do this is the combination
of nely disaggregated data on electoral outcomes and investment projects.2 The most impor-
1Throughout the paper, we will sometimes also refer to municipalities as “cities” or “towns”.
2Our unit of analysis is the census area. Spain has over 35,000 census areas that have no electoral representation
and are dened for merely statistical purposes. In 2009 there were a total of 8,114 municipalities in Spain and
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tant empirical challenge we face when conducting our analysis arises because the geographical
distribution of voter preferences is endogenous to economic, social and cultural factors. These
factors may, in turn, also aect investment decisions (for example, see Brollo and Nannicini
2012). This identication problem is also shared by much of the literature studying the elec-
toral determinants of spending across core and swing voters. We overcome this issue by ex-
ploiting as-good-as-random variation in the identity of the incumbent party in a close-election
regression-discontinuity design. To implement this strategy, we rely on intra-municipal varia-
tion in Plan E spending and in the incumbents’ electoral support.
We construct two dierent measures of party “supporter bias” at the census area level (our
unit of analysis), which will serve as dependent variables in our RDD estimation. A good mea-
sure of the extent to which the incumbent targets its supporters should have the following
properties. First, it should be large both when a census area with relatively strong incumbent
support is favoured disproportionately in the allocation of projects, and when areas of low sup-
port receive little investment. Second, it should indicate a low level of bias in cases of little
support and high investment, or strong support and little investment.
Our resulting RDD estimates show that there is no supporter bias in the allocation of
projects within municipalities. Specically, using variation induced by elections won by a small
margin, we show that incumbents do not favour areas of strong electoral support. When using
our extensive margin measure, point estimates are very small, with our preferred specication
yielding a positive and insignicant eect of 1.5% of a standard deviation of the dependent
variable. Estimates using the intensive margin measure, which captures both the amount of
investment and the strength of voter support are also small and statistically indistinguishable
from zero. Our results stand in contrast to previous studies which use aggregate data at the
district or county level and nd a positive association between expenditures and incumbent
support (Levitt and Snyder, Jr., 1995; Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2006). Furthermore, we note
that the partisan bias identied in the alignment literature is entirely absent within cities.
We explore several possible explanations for our ndings. To start, our result could be the
consequence of two implicit assumptions in our main empirical analysis: rst, that only voters
in the census area that receive a project can benet from it; second, that all dierent types of
Plan E projects have the same eect on voters. We relax these assumptions in two ways. First,
we allow investment projects to have spillover eects to neighbouring areas by creating circular
buer areas around each of them. In this way, a project carried out close to the border of two
census areas is counted as having taken place in both. Alternatively, we restrict our sample
by concentrating only on those categories of projects that are most likely to have localised
benets. Results from these two additional specications are in line with our main ndings
and show that there is no eect of electoral support on investment decisions. On the other
hand, we observe that political participation appears to respond to investment: conditional on
initial levels, areas that receive a Plan E project experience an increase in turnout. This result
has two implications. First, it indicates that projects have a localised eect on voters. Secondly,
it suggests that, rather that favouring supporters, politicians may be targeting inactive voters
roughly one in four had more than one census area.
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with spending to foster mobilization.
This paper studies the distribution of public money within the city, hence it lies at the
intersection between political economy and urban economics. An important strand of this
literature asks if political factors can shape local policies. Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) and
Pettersson-Lidbom (2008) study how parties dier in implementing policies in the US and Swe-
den, respectively, using a regression-discontinuity design. Along the same lines, Solé-Ollé and
Viladecans-Marsal (2013) show that centre-right municipal governments in Spain have more
expansive zoning policies. This literature treats municipalities as units of observation and
therefore abstracts from variation within the city boundaries in both the intensity of policy
intervention and the geographic distribution of electoral support. Our paper contributes to this
literature by investigating partisan dierences in policies inside the city.
Our paper also relates to a critique raised by Cox (2009) regarding a frequent mismatch be-
tween the theory and the empirics of distributional politics studies. Specically, while several
studies document whether parties target swing or core districts, they are not informative about
how resources are distributed across groups of voters.3 Most of these papers analyse the alloca-
tion of government funds across municipalities, districts or states (see Wright 1974; Strömberg
2004).4 Ansolabehere and Snyder (2006) use data on US state expenditures across counties and
nd evidence in favour of the core voters hypothesis but no evidence of swing voter targeting.
By studying allocations across geographical areas within municipalities, our paper avoids the
problem highlighted by Cox (2009). Census areas are not districts, counties or municipalities
and have no institutional entity of their own, hence can be treated as an aggregation of voters.
This allows for a more direct mapping between the predictions of these models and the empir-
ical analysis. Overall, our results show that, when studying allocations within the city, there is
little evidence of core voter targeting.
A growing literature shows evidence of an alignment eect in the allocation of national
transfers to local governments. For example, Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2008) and Curto-
Grau, Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2017) show that Spanish municipalities aligned with
upper tier governments are favoured in the allocation of transfers. Using dierent research
designs, this eect has been documented for several countries, such as Albania (Case, 2001),
Italy (Bracco et al., 2015), Portugal (Migueis, 2013), and the United States (Levitt and Snyder, Jr.,
1995). We distinguish ourselves from this literature because, in our context, there are no local
administrative units or electoral districts between the allocating body and the spatial voter
groups that constitute our unit of observation.
3A similar point is made in the review by Golden and Min (2013): “The weakness [of these studies] is that
results accord poorly with the individual-level theory that is usually held to be relevant.”
4An exception, using data on city-level budget allocations is found in Trounstine (2006). This is, however,
largely descriptive and does not investigate the spatial distribution of resources within the city.
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2. Institutional Setting
2.1. Plan E
Plan E was announced in November 2008 in Spain by the PSOE (centre-left) national govern-
ment of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero.5 It was a large, urgent, stimulus plan aimed at boosting
economic activity and fostering employment growth in the midst of the economic crisis. The
plan was carried out in two parts, starting in 2009 with FEIL – which provided municipalities
with roughly 8,000 million Euros – and following with the smaller FEESL program in 2010 –
accounting for over 4,000 millions Euros. There was an additional and much smaller plan aect-
ing province-level bodies called CN over this period. In total, Plan E transferred public funds
to local government for about 0.8% of the 2009 Spanish GDP.
The actual investment and spending decisions were carried out by municipalities. Each
municipality was eligible to an amount proportional to its population and had to submit projects
to the central government for approval. More than 99% of municipalities decided to apply. Over
99% of the submitted projects – each of which could not exceed 5 million Euros – was approved
and received full funding (see Montolio 2016).6
The nearly universal approval rate reects the fact that criteria to obtain funding were very
lax. A subsequent report from the Tribunal de Cuentas (National Audit Oce) found that these
criteria were generic, imprecise and weakly enforced. This gave local governments ample scope
for discretionary use of resources, even allowing several municipalities to use funds for invest-
ments that did not full the legal requirements (Tribunal de Cuentas, 2013).7 Municipalities
had a short window of time to present applications (45 days for FEIL and 90 for FEESL), which
essentially consisted of a description of the project and a budget. In order to be eligible for
funding, projects had to be new, in the sense that they could not be projects already included
in the previous budget, and works had to start within one month from approval.
A total of 57,850 investment projects were carried out by municipal governments using
Plan E funding between 2009 and 2011. The most common projects, as shown in table 1, were
related to “rehabilitation and improvement of public spaces”, which refers to refurbishment of
parks, plazas and pedestrian walkways (see Figure B.9 in the appendix for an example). The
second most common type was “equipment and service infrastructure” which is a much more
heterogeneous category encompassing street lighting, improvement of transport infrastructure,
occasionally refurbishment of parks and sport facilities as well as water works. The average cost
of each project was slightly above 210,000 Euros, indicating that small and middle-scale projects
were common. The Plan E program had a large impact on local government endowments,
roughly tripling the pre-crisis amount of yearly resources spent on municipal investment.
Projects had to be clearly advertised by installing a large signboard containing information
on the amount spent, the contractor and the expected completion time. The layout, size and
5Formally, the name of the policy was Plan Español para el Estímulo de la Economía y el Empleo (Spanish Plan
for Employment and Economic Stimulus).
6A total of 19 municipalities did not carry out directly any Plan E project. In all these cases, Plan E funding
was allocated to the association of municipalities instead of the municipalities themselves.
7The lax criteria of the national government in the approval of projects was motivated by the aim to initiate
spending as quickly as possible to attenuate the impact of the crisis.
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Table 1
Descriptives - Summary of Project Types
N. of projects Frequency
Rehabilitation of public space 7107 18.53
Basic services infrastructure 5924 15.45
Construction and improvement of social and cultural facilities 5819 15.17
Cultural and sport related buildings and equipment 3946 10.29
Energy eciency and conservation 3813 9.94
Improvement in public spaces and road networks 2423 6.32
Social buildings and equipment 1718 4.48
Construction and upgrading of education centres 1385 3.61
Urban sustainability and pollution control 875 2.28
Promoting mobility and safety 853 2.22
Protection of historical and landscape heritage 767 2
Conservation of historical and municipal sites 569 1.48
Other 3154 8.22
Notes: Number and relative frequency for all the investment projects, by project type. Sample restricted to projects
which have correct geocoding information. All municipalities.
content of these signboards was regulated by law. As shown in gure B.10 in the appendix,
signboard’s headlines indicated that the project in question was promoted by the municipal
government. Given the national coverage received by Plan E, the role of the socialist central
government was also quite salient. However, this saliency did not appear to inuence project
allocations. On the rst place, there were no dierences between parties in the allocation of
Plan E funding per capita. Secondly, it did not lead to local electoral rewards for the Zapatero
government. Finally, take-up was generally high and anecdotal evidence suggests that mu-
nicipal governments were eager to receive the funds regardless of their partisan aliation.8
Detailed evidence on these matters will be presented in section 5.
As table 1 shows, most of the public works executed with Plan E nancing are likely to
have geographically localised eects, therefore beneting voters who live close to the site of
the project. Anecdotal evidence indicates that local politicians are aware of this.9 This notion
motivates our use of the census area, a small area within the municipality, as unit of analysis.
When discussing our results in section 4, we will relax the assumption that the benets of a
project accrue only within the census area.
2.2. Municipalities and Local Elections
Spain had 8,114 municipalities in 2009. Municipalities are the lowest level of territorial
administration of the Spanish state and have autonomy in managing their interests as recog-
8A centre-right politician from Partido Popular we interviewed said: “It was an enormous grant, which many
interpreted as a letter to the three kings” (our translation), referring to the biblical Magi bringing gifts to the
newborn Jesus.
9An interviewed local ocial responsible for urban planning declared that projects were assigned “[...] so that
they had high visibility in the neighbourhood”. A prominent politician from Madrid, referring to the beneciaries
of investment projects, added “evidently, carrying out a project entails benets for the neighbours in the area.”
(our translation).
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nized in the Spanish constitution. Their functions are partly dependent on size and encompass
lighting, transport network upkeep, public parks, local services (e.g. sports facilities, public
libraries), waste disposal, water and sewage services.10 Municipal nancing is based on munic-
ipal taxes (the largest of which are a property tax and a tax on rms) and transfers from the
national and regional governments. Note that Plan E project nancing was not part of these
regular transfers.
The governing body is the municipal council and its members are directly elected by res-
idents. Municipal elections are held every four years under a single-district, closed list, pro-
portional electoral system.11 The single-district electoral rule is important for our analysis as it
allows us to treat spatial units within the municipalities as voter groups rather than electoral
districts. It also grounds the notion that all votes for a party contribute the same towards the
goal of winning government (something that does not apply in multi-district constituencies).
Municipal council seats are assigned following the D’Hondt rule. The average size of coun-
cils elected under the closed list system is roughly 10, with the number of members ranging
from 7 in the smaller towns up to a maximum of 57 in Madrid. The municipal mayor is elected
by the council under a majority rule and in general this majority is obtained through coalition
building after elections. The council votes proposals by the mayor, who acts mainly as an the
agenda-setter. Given the strong discipline enforced by parties in Spain and the impossibility of
calling early elections, local governments are usually stable. Below, the ruling party refers to
the party of the mayor.
For data collection and voting purposes, the National Statistical Institute (INE) divides the
Spanish territory into roughly 35,000 census areas (also referred to as electoral areas) with
no administrative powers. These areas are dened as a function of municipal boundaries and
population. Census areas are the smallest spatial unit for which we can obtain electoral results
from Ministry of Internal Aairs (Ministerio del Interior). Given that many municipalities are
small, only 2,278 of them had more than one census area within their boundaries in 2007.
2.3. Political Parties in 2007 and 2011
The socialist party (PSOE) held the national government between 2004 and 2011 under two
terms of President Zapatero. At the national level, the centre-right Popular Party (PP) was the
main opposition party and eventually took power from the socialists in 2011.
The municipal elections before and after Plan E took place in 2007 and 2011, respectively.
In the 2007 election, the two main parties, Zapatero’s PSOE and the centre-right PP, obtained
comparable results. A total of 36% of all municipalities were ruled by PSOE in 2007, while 39%
were ruled by PP. In 2011, almost three years into the nancial crisis, these gures changed
to 27.6% and 46.5% respectively. In both terms, the third party with most appointed mayors
was the nationalist Catalan party Convergència i Unió which ruled 5.2% and 6.3% of municipal-
ities, respectively. In total, the 9 most important national level parties in Spain ruled 89% of
10See details in law number 7/1985 (2 of April 1985, Ley Reguladora de las Bases del Régimen Local).
11See Chapter IV of Ley Orgánica del Régimen Electoral General. Municipalities with populations under 250
inhabitants have an open list system with voters able to express multiple preferences for dierent candidates.
These municipalities will not be used in our analysis.
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municipalities in 2007.12 A number of smaller, local parties, rule the remaining municipalities.
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics
In order to study how the geography of voter support shapes public spending allocations
we need disaggregated data on electoral outcomes and geo-located data on Plan E investment
projects. Data on individual projects were obtained directly from the Plan E website, and include
the coordinates of projects (as geo-located by the municipal authorities), a short description, a
classication in terms of project types and the cost of each project.
The raw data contain a total of 57,850 projects. Some categories correspond to investments
that clearly yield no dierential geographical benet to voters. For example, spending on tech-
nological upgrading of the public administration is usually geo-located in the city hall but does
not only benet people living next to the city hall. We identify and exclude a total of 6,574
projects which correspond to these categories.13 In addition, for a subset of projects, the geo-
location data on latitude and longitude is incorrect or missing. When possible, we geo-located
these projects manually using address or other location information from the short project
description. In total, we were able to hand code 3,065 projects ourselves. Our nal sample
therefore contains a total of 38,353 projects (for details on these restrictions see table B.2 in the
appendix). Project types in this sample and their frequencies are displayed in table 1.
We combine information on Plan E investment projects with data on municipal and national
elections. Data on electoral outcomes at the census area level are obtained from the Ministry of
Internal Aairs, the body responsible for collecting and disseminating information on electoral
results. We complement it with information on mayors and their political party of aliation
from the same source. Figure 1 plots results of the 2007 municipal elections for each of the cen-
sus areas of Sevilla and Madrid, together with the distribution of Plan E projects. Red areas are
those where left-wing PSOE was the most voted party while blue indicates areas of PP majority.
We can see that the support for both parties varies signicantly across neighbourhoods. This
within-city variation in electoral support will be instrumental to study the link between the
geography of voter support and the allocation of Plan E projects in the following sections.
Finally, we integrate our dataset with municipal and census area level information from
INE (the national statistical oce) and from the 2001 Population Census. Census data includes
characteristics at the census areas level such as population and density, together with the frac-
tions of college graduates, unemployed, home-owners, foreigners, the number of children, and
elderly residents. To control for possible factors aecting the local demand for investment, we
also use information on the number of households that reported the presence of crime and a
lack of green areas in the neighbourhood. Lastly, we also include the fraction of urban discon-
tinuous terrain at the census area level (obtained from Corine Land Cover).
12These are PP, PSOE, CIU, IU, CC, ERC, PNV, PAR and BNG. By national level parties we mean parties that also
run in national elections.
13The categories in question are: technological upgrading of the public administration, electronic management,
industrial rehabilitation, eciency in the management of water sources, management and treatment of urban
waste, repairs in water supply systems and repairs in sewage outlet systems.
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Figure 1
Plan E Projects and political support for PSOE (red) and PP (blue)
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Notes: Points correspond to Plan E projects located in the municipalities of Sevilla (top panel) and Madrid (bottom
panel). Census areas are coloured in red if the socialist party PSOE received the majority of votes in the 2007
municipal election, with the intensity of the shade varying with the vote share. Similarly, blue areas correspond
to areas where the right-wing PP obtained the majority of votes.
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We limit our analysis to municipalities having at least two census areas. This is essential in
order to have variation in vote shares within each municipality. By doing so, we exclude small
towns, restricting our sample to 2,278 municipalities. We will further restrict our analysis to
municipalities ruled in 2007 by one of the 9 national level parties with most mayors. We impose
this restriction in order to ensure we can correctly match the party names in the census area
electoral data with those appearing in the data on mayors. Our nal sample is composed of
2,046 municipalities which include a total of 28,083 census areas.
Table 2 includes some descriptive statistics for the census areas in our our sample. As Panel
A shows, the average census area has a surface area of about 8 squared kilometres, and 1,400
inhabitants, of which 1,100 are eligible to vote. Given that these areas are designed to contain
comparable numbers of voters, there is substantial variation in their physical size, matching the
variation in densities, from large cities with small census areas to sparsely populated and ex-
tended countryside villages with large ones. Panel B indicates that 40% of census areas received
at least one Plan E project, with a corresponding average investment per capita of 215 Euros.
Finally, the last panel of table 2 shows some average gures from the 2001 Population Census
variables that will be used as controls in our main specication. Descriptives at the municipal
level are reported in table B.1 in the appendix.
4. Empirical Analysis
In this section we test whether incumbent local politicians target their own supporters in
the allocation of Plan E investment projects. To understand our empirical strategy, consider
the following thought experiment. There are several cities, each ruled by either party A or
party B. Each city is composed of neighbourhoods, which can support party A or B. We dene
a local government as favouring its supporters if it disproportionately allocates investment to
its neighbourhoods, neglecting neighbourhoods of the opposing party.
If parties are not assigned randomly, observing that certain areas are favoured may be the
result of inherent dierences between cities beyond the identity of the ruling party. For exam-
ple, suppose cities ruled by party A are more likely to have parks and that party A supporters
prefer to live close to parks. If parks need recurring investments, we would observe a spend-
ing bias towards party A neighbourhoods even if these local governments had no intention
to favour their supporters. The randomisation of the party in oce would instead guarantee
that all municipal characteristics are balanced. In this case, a comparison of the allocations
between municipalities would be free of the bias induced by omitted variables correlated with
the location of voters. This comparison could then be used to detect the presence of supporter
bias.
Let us translate this thought experiment into our context. In the rst place, our “neigh-
bourhoods” will be census areas and we will use previous votes shares at the census area level
as a measure of support for dierent parties within cities. Secondly, the assignment of Plan E
projects in space will be used to determine which census areas receive more resources. Finally,
we exploit quasi-random variation in the identity of the ruling party by implementing a close-
election regression-discontinuity design (or RDD, see Lee 2008). For this purpose we need to
select a reference party and measure to what extent areas supporting this party are favoured
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Table 2
Descriptives - Census area level data
Mean Std. dev. Min Max
A. General information
Surface (2007, km2) 8.41 34.69 0.004 1125.112
Density (2007, 1000 inh./km2) 19.86 21.55 0.001 349.804
Population (2007) 1,423 563.75 294 12,859
Eligible voters (2007) 1,100 441.03 226 10,881
Turnout (2007) 0.61 0.12 0.085 0.922
Turnout (2011) 0.62 0.10 0.157 1.000
B. Plan E projects
Indicator for receiving 1+ projects 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00
N. of projects received 0.91 1.72 0.00 49.00
Investment in projects (Euros per capita) 214.76 713.16 0.00 33420.26
C. Population Census information (2001)
Higher education 0.12 0.10 0.000 0.556
Home owners 0.84 0.12 0.004 1.000
Foreigners 0.04 0.05 0.000 0.811
Households with 1+ unemployed 0.16 0.07 0.003 0.730
Households reporting not enough green areas 0.38 0.24 0.000 0.993
Households reporting crime is high 0.24 0.19 0.000 0.977
People 0-16 yrs. 0.15 0.05 0.031 0.394
People 16-64 yrs. 0.67 0.05 0.280 0.927
People 65+ yrs. 0.17 0.08 0.006 0.654
Observations 28,083
Notes: Panel A reports averages for some characteristics of interest for the 28,083 census areas in the sample
(2,046 municipalities). Turnout gures refer to the 2007 and 2011 municipal elections, respectively. Panel B shows
descriptives for the Plan E investment program, and panel C shows data from the 2001 Population Census. These
variables measure, for a given census area, the fraction of people with a particular characteristic at the time of the
Census. In some categories – explicitly indicated – the unit of observation is the household and not the individual.
in the allocation of resources when this party wins an election by a narrow margin. We select
the center-left PSOE as our reference party because this was the party with most mayors in our
2007 sample.14
To implement a regression-discontinuity design, we need to dene both a running variable
and a census-area level variable measuring whether PSOE voters are favoured in the allocation
of investment. Regarding the former, the standard used in the literature is the margin of victory
of the reference party (e.g., Lee 2008; Beland 2015). This would be appropriate in the context of
direct election of mayors. However, in a multi-party system with indirect election of mayors,
14Note that the choice of the reference party is somewhat arbitrary and should only have a minor eect in
estimation. In a two party system, this choice is without loss of generality as the estimated eects are obtained
from dierences between the two parties (for example, in US studies such as Beland 2015, the reference party
is usually the Democratic party). Unreported estimates using right-wing PP as the reference party yield similar
results.
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the margin of victory is not an appropriate measure of closeness of an election. Instead, we fol-
low Folke (2014) (as implemented by Fiva, Folke and Sorensen 2016) and construct our running
variable by computing the vote share distance to a PSOE seats majority in the local council.
To measure favouritism towards PSOE voters, we construct two dierent measures combining
information on Plan E investments and the PSOE vote share. These will be designed to capture
both intensive and extensive margins in allocations and voter preferences. We turn to these
issues in the following.
4.1. Close-Elections Regression-Discontinuity Design
The rst step to implement our RD strategy is to construct a running variable that mea-
sures the closeness of the municipal election. Given the electoral system prevailing in Spain,
we adapt the method described in Fiva, Folke and Sorensen (2016). As an illustration of the
procedure, assume that, after the election, PSOE obtained the majority of seats in a given mu-
nicipality.15 The running variable is constructed using an iterative procedure as follows. First,
we reduce the vote share of PSOE by a small amount (in our case we used 0.25%), and redis-
tribute the corresponding votes among the other parties, proportionally to their vote shares.
Then, we calculate the new distribution of seats using the D’Hondt rule. If the seats majority
did not change, we decrease the vote share by an additional 0.25%, iterating the procedure until
a change in the majority is reached. The change in the vote share needed to reach a majority
change is the value of our running variable for the municipality in question, henceforth simply
the PSOE winning margin. In this particular example, the winning margin is positive because
PSOE started with a seat majority. In municipalities where PSOE did not have a majority to start
with, we proceed in the opposite way, adding votes until a majority is reached. In these cases
the winning margin variable is negative. We perform these calculations for all municipalities
in our sample.
Figure 2 shows that, as expected, the winning margin ranges from -0.5 to 0.5. Furthermore,
it does not appear to jump discontinuously around zero, suggesting that there is no systematic
manipulation around the threshold where the seats majority change. The absence of a disconti-
nuity in the distribution of the running variable is evidence in support of one of the fundamental
RDD assumptions, namely that parties are unable to perfectly manipulate electoral outcomes
(Lee, 2008; McCrary, 2008). A formal McCrary test for the absence of a discontinuity yields a
p-value of 0.16. Using Cattaneo, Jansson and Ma (2016)’s RD manipulation test, however, we
fail to reject the null with a p-value of 0.51. Both provide formal grounding to the assumption
of absence of manipulation at the threshold.
Because of the indirect election of mayors in Spain, obtaining the majority of seats does
not necessarily lead to mayoralty. Therefore we need to implement a fuzzy RDD, in which
the indicator for a PSOE mayor is instrumented by an indicator for the winning margin being
positive (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008). The corresponding rst stage is as follows:
PSOEm = pi0 + pi11(PSOE WinMarginm > 0) + f(PSOE WinMarginm) + γ
′Xcm + ucm,
(1)
15We say PSOE has a majority when it has strictly more seats than any other party in the municipal council.
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Figure 2
Histogram of the density of the winning margin variable
0
1
2
3
4
−.4 −.2 0 .2 .4
Notes: Histogram of municipal level PSOE winning margin for all municipalities in the sample, dened as the
PSOE vote share change necessary for PSOE to win (lose) the seat majority in the municipal council (details in
the text). Positive values correspond to municipalities in which PSOE obtained the majority of seats in the 2007
elections. Negative values correspond to municipalities in which PSOE did not obtain the majority in 2007. Test
of no perfect manipulation as in McCrary (2008) leads to a p-value of 0.16. Alternatively, the test proposed in
Cattaneo, Jansson and Ma (2016) yields a p-value of 0.51.
where PSOEm is a dummy taking value 1 if PSOE is in power in municipality m by the time
Plan E was carried out, WinMarginPSOEm > 0 is a dummy taking value 1 if PSOE ob-
tained the majority of seats in the 2007 municipal elections and f(PSOE WinMarginm) is a
polynomial in the winning margin. Xcm is a vector of census-area level controls including the
logarithm of population, census area density and surface, the fraction of urban discontinuous
terrain, the distance from the municipal centroid, and a series of 8 control variables from the
2001 Census.16 We will report estimates of two types. In the rst place we use the full sam-
ple with third degree global polynomials in the running variable as controls on either side of
the threshold. Secondly, we apply the optimal bandwidth selector by Calonico, Cattaneo and
Titiunik (2014) (henceforth CCT) to restrict the sample to observations close to the threshold,
and use linear control functions in the forcing variable on either side. Given that linear con-
trol functions have more attractive properties for discontinuity estimates, this is our preferred
specication (Gelman and Imbens, 2014). In all specications in this section, we weight each
observation by the inverse of the number of census areas so that each municipality has the
same weight.17 Figure 3 shows that the probability of a PSOE government jumps discontinu-
16Specically, the fraction of individuals who are unemployed, foreign-born, college-educated, aged 0-16, aged
16-64; the fraction of households reporting crime is an issue, lack of green areas, or owning a home.
17In practice the weighting is implemented using the inverse of the number of census areas as “analytical
weights” in STATA 14, the software used in estimation. The rdbwselect command that calculates the Calonico,
Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) optimal bandwidth also allows for weights. Weighting observations by the ratio of
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ously around the winning margin threshold. First-stage regressions using dierent bandwidths
are provided in table B.3 in the appendix and conrm our instrument is strong, with F-statistics
above 30 in all cases.
Figure 3
First Stage Discontinuity
Notes: The vertical axis measures the probability of having a PSOE mayor and horizontal axis measures the
winning margin of PSOE in the 2007 municipal elections, as dened in the text. Positive values indicate the mu-
nicipality had a PSOE seat majority and negative values indicate it did not. Solid lines represent tted values
from a local polynomial smooth regression estimated with an Epanechnikov kernel and bandwidth calculated
using Silverman’s rule-of-thumb.
Before moving on to the denition of the dependent variable, we present some evidence
in favour of the continuity assumption required for the validity of RDD in gure B.6 in the
appendix. This gure shows the averages for several census area characteristics calculated in
bins of 1% of the winning margin, together with tted values from a local polynomial regres-
sion. None of the averages jump at the threshold, suggesting that municipalities where PSOE
barely won the elections are comparable, in terms of observables characteristics, to those where
PSOE barely lost. Table B.4 shows discontinuity estimates for each covariate using our main
specication, which uses a local linear regression allowing for a dierent slope at either side
of the threshold. The bandwidth is calculated using the CCT method on our main specica-
tion (of equation 2 below) and is equal to 9.6%. Finally, the standard errors are clustered at the
municipal level. Regression estimates are entirely consistent with the graphical evidence. The
estimated discontinuities are small and in 11 out of 12 cases not statistically signicant at any
the population in the census area and the municipal population yields very similar results.
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conventional level.
To implement the RDD design, we need to construct a measure of “supporter bias” at the
census area level. A good measure of the extent to which PSOE mayors target their supporters
should have the following properties. First, it should be large both when a census area with
relatively strong PSOE support is favoured disproportionately in the allocation of projects and
when areas of low support receive little investment. Second, it should indicate a low level of
bias in cases of little support and high investment, or strong support and little investment. A
variable with these properties would pick up the disproportionate allocation of projects to (or
away from) PSOE areas.
We consider two alternatives. The rst measure is meant to capture the extensive margin
of investment, that is, the discrete decision of whether to invest or not in areas with many
supporters. This measure, which we denote as ExtensiveBiascm, is dened as the interaction
of a variable that equals one if census area c in municipality m received at least one Plan E
project (and -1 otherwise) and a variable that equals one if the PSOE vote share in this area is
higher that the PSOE vote share in the municipality (and -1 otherwise). Using a negative number
instead of the zero in the denition of these two indicator variables allows the resulting bias
measure to be symmetric, being positive when a supporter bias exists and negative when it
does not.
Because it is the interaction of two binary variables, however, this measure can only take
on two values. As such, it can only measure the extensive margin of supporter bias because it
does not capture dierences in the amount of investment received by dierent areas or in the
strength of the electoral support. To incorporate intensive margin variation, we construct an-
other measure of supporter bias, IntensiveBiascm, as the interaction of the dierence between
the Plan E investment (in per capita terms) carried out in the census area and the municipal
average investment, and the dierence between the PSOE vote shares at the census area level
and the municipal aggregate vote share. This variable is able to capture, at the same time, dif-
ferences in the intensity of investment and in the presence of more or less supporters across
census areas. To have scale-free measures of bias and facilitate the interpretation of the results,
we standardize both variables using their overall mean and standard deviation.
We specify the structural equation that completes our fuzzy-RD model as
Biascm =α + f(PSOE WinMarginm) + δPSOEm + γ
′Xcm + cm, (2)
where, as above, c indexes census areas and m indexes municipalities. The outcome variable
Biascm can be either ExtensiveBiascm or IntensiveBiascm, vector Xcm include controls as
dened above, and PSOEm is an indicator for PSOE being in charge of the municipal govern-
ment.
4.2. Estimation Results
Before moving to a formal estimation of the RD model, in gure 4 we show how these
two bias measures behave as a function of the PSOE winning margin, with dots representing
weighted averages in bins of size 1% and lines being local linear regression estimates. Because
both measures are standardized, the eect at the discontinuity can be interpreted in terms
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of standard deviations of the dependent variable. The graphical evidence indicates that the
reduced-form eect of a PSOE mayor on both supporter bias measures is modest, and well
below one-tenth of a standard deviation.
Figure 4
Reduced-Form Effect of PSOE Government on Supporter Bias Measures
Extensive Margin
Intensive Margin
Notes: The vertical axis shows dierent measures of bias in the allocation of Plan E projects towards PSOE
voters. The horizontal axis shows the PSOE winning margin, dened as the vote share distance to a seat ma-
jority change. Dots are averages in 1% bins of the winning margin, with each observation being weighted by
the inverse of the number of census area in the municipality, so that all municipalities have the same weight.
The lines are local linear regression estimates using the Epanechnikov kernel and a bandwidth calculated using
Silverman’s rule-of-thumb.
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Fuzzy RD estimates of equation 2 are reported in table 3 for both the extensive and inten-
sive margin measures and including or excluding controls. In the rst two columns we use
the whole sample and include in estimation a third-degree polynomial in the winning margin,
while in the last two we restrict the sample to observations within the CCT optimal bandwidth,
using a linear control function. Given the standardization, estimates are interpreted in terms
of standard deviations of the dependent variable.
Table 3
RDD Results - Supporter Bias in Allocation of Investment
Full sample CCT bandwidth
A. Extensive Margin Measure
PSOE mayor 0.047 0.050 0.032 0.015
(0.200) (0.203) (0.153) (0.157)
Bandwidth 0.500 0.500 0.096 0.096
Controls N Y N Y
Obs. 27897 27885 13246 13245
B. Intensive Margin Measure
PSOE mayor -0.119 -0.129 -0.123 -0.127
(0.108) (0.110) (0.100) (0.102)
Bandwidth 0.500 0.500 0.076 0.076
Controls N Y N Y
Obs. 27527 27517 10816 10816
Notes: RDD results for the extensive and intensive margin measures of PSOE supporter bias. Both variables are
normalized to have zero mean and standard deviation equal to 1. Estimates obtained by two-stage least squares
using an indicator for PSOE having the seats majority as an instrument for the indicator for PSOE being in power,
while controlling for the winning margin in the 2007 municipal elections as dened in the text. Columns 1 and
2 use the full sample and third-degree polynomials in the winning margin, allowed to dier on either side of the
threshold. Columns 3 and 4 restrict the sample to observations within the Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014)
optimal bandwidth around the threshold, with a linear control function of the winning margin with possibly
dierent slopes on either side. All estimates are obtained by weighting each census area by the inverse of the
number of sections in its municipality. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level.
Our estimates show that PSOE mayors who won the election by a small margin do not
favour areas where relatively more of their supporters live. When using the extensive margin
measure, point estimates are very small, with the largest suggesting a positive eect of 4.7% of a
standard deviation. When using the Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) optimal bandwidth,
the magnitude decreases to 1.5%with a corresponding 95% condence interval of [−0.29, 0.32].
While the clustered standard errors are relatively large, the condence intervals allow us to rule
out eects larger that one-third of a standard deviation in either direction.
Panel B shows similar estimates using the intensive margin measure, which captures both
the amount of investment and the strength of voter support dimensions. Taking as a reference
the specication with controls and optimal bandwidth of column 4, again we observe a small
(in this case negative) eect, with a 95% condence interval of [−0.33, 0.07], again conrming
that PSOE does not appear to signicantly target its voters with the allocation of investment
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projects. Even if estimates are larger in absolute value than those obtained using the intensive
bias measure, they are more precise, probably owing to the fact that we also exploit variation
in the size of investment and electoral support.
In gure 5 we explore the sensitivity of the results to dierent bandwidth choices by esti-
mating the model restricting the sample to smaller and smaller bandwidths in increments of
1% of the winning margin. The CCT optimal bandwidth is reported for reference as a verti-
cal line. As the graphs show, point estimates are small for most magnitudes and smaller than
1/10 of a standard deviation at the CCT bandwidth for either measure. As we narrow down
the bandwidth around the majority threshold, the estimates become less precise – as shown
by the widening of condence intervals – but remain statistically insignicant. Given that the
increase in the standard errors is due to the sample size reduction and that point estimates
oscillate tightly around zero without a clear pattern, we infer that our baseline estimates are
not driven by our particular choice of bandwidth but, instead, reect the lack of any appre-
ciable eect in data. Collectively, all results in this section lead us to conclude that there was
no favouring of supporters in the allocation of Plan E projects. If distributive politics play a
role inside cities in our context, then this does not operate through the targeting of supporters’
neighbourhoods.
A nal note is due about the interpretation of our results. RDD estimates are obtained using
local variation coming from close elections. Hence, the group of municipalities that we use for
identication are electorally competitive by construction. If supporter targeting were a specic
feature of electorally uncompetitive environments (as suggested, for example, in Trounstine
2006), then it might be problematic to extrapolate our local result to the rest of the popula-
tion. Therefore, our results are especially informative about distributive politics in competitive
electoral contexts.
5. Discussion
As reported in the previous section, we nd than incumbent’s supporters were not favoured
in the allocation of Plan E projects within cities. Alternative empirical strategies based on
within-city regressions, reported in a previous version of this paper, also lead to the same qual-
itative ndings (see Carozzi and Repetto 2017). This result stands in contrast to the large body of
empirical evidence showing that being aligned with the national government’s party positively
aects local nances, and with local-level evidence on politicians targeting core supporters (e.g.
Ansolabehere and Snyder 2006). How can we reconcile these apparently contradictory results?
There are several candidate explanations.
A possible concern is that the investment plan carried out under Plan E is somehow ill-suited
to answer our research question. To start, the national government could have used the formal
approval process to favour certain municipalities or even to aect the distribution of investment
within the municipality. As discussed in section 2, however, the vast majority of municipalities
received the full amount they applied for (see also Montolio 2016; Tribunal de Cuentas 2013),
suggesting that the approval process was de facto not imposing any substantial constraints
or limitations on the choice of projects. One might still be concerned that the national-level
PSOE government favoured aligned municipalities, either to benet fellow party members or to
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Figure 5
Baseline Estimates for Different Bandwidths
Extensive Margin
Intensive Margin
Notes: RDD results for the extensive and intensive margin measures of PSOE supporter bias. Both outcome
variables are normalized to have zero mean and standard deviation equal to one. The solid lines report point
estimates using dierent bandwidth values as specied in the horizontal axis. 95% condence intervals based
on clustered s.e. displayed as dashed lines. Vertical lines correspond to Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014)
optimal bandwidths.
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Table 4
RDD Additional Results
Extensive Margin Intensive Margin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Projects with Localized Benets
PSOE mayor 0.050 0.015 -0.156 -0.105
(0.203) (0.157) (0.096) (0.083)
F-Stat 35.2 49.4 35.2 39.8
Bandwidth 0.50 0.10 0.50 0.08
Obs. 27885 13245 27517 12048
B. 100 Metre Buers
PSOE mayor -0.049 -0.042 0.042 -0.008
(0.183) (0.131) (0.061) (0.043)
F-Stat 35.2 55.8 35.2 49.4
Bandwidth 0.50 0.11 0.50 0.10
Obs. 27885 14687 27522 13079
C. Large Municipalities
PSOE mayor 0.007 0.008 -0.058 -0.094
(0.319) (0.250) (0.184) (0.163)
F-Stat 10.0 14.9 10.0 11.5
Bandwidth 0.50 0.09 0.50 0.08
Obs. 26927 12166 26559 10923
D. Small Municipalities
PSOE mayor 0.143 0.033 -0.163 -0.162
(0.266) (0.239) (0.112) (0.105)
F-Stat 63.8 70.0 63.8 67.4
Bandwidth 0.50 0.12 0.50 0.11
Obs. 958 492 958 459
Notes: RDD results for the extensive and intensive margin measures of PSOE supporter bias. Both variables are
normalized to have zero mean and standard deviation equal to 1. Estimates obtained by two-stage least squares
using an indicator for PSOE having the seats majority as an instrument for the indicator for PSOE being in power,
while controlling for the winning margin in the 2007 municipal elections as dened in the text. Columns 1 and
2 use the full sample and third-degree polynomials in the winning margin, allowed to dier on either side of the
threshold. Columns 3 and 4 restrict the sample to observations within the Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014)’s
optimal bandwidth around the threshold, with a linear control function of the winning margin with possibly
dierent slopes on either side. Panel A uses only project types considered to have strongly localised geographical
benets (see text). Panel B uses, as outcome variables, measures obtained assuming that investment projects aect
census areas within 100 metres of the geo-coded location. Panel C and D restrict the sample to municipalities
larger or smaller than 3,000 inhabitants (respectively). First-stage F-statistics and bandwidth around the threshold
are indicated alongside observations in the table foot. All estimates are obtained by weighting each census area
by the inverse of the number of sections in its municipality. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level.
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directly gain votes at the local level. This could give the national government some ownership
in the allocation process within cities even if this rested nominally with local authorities. In
order to exclude this possibility, we modify our RDD analysis to study whether PSOE local
governments received more total Plan E funding (in per capita terms). Reduced-form results
are illustrated in gure B.8 in the appendix. We see that Plan E investment at the municipal
level does not vary signicantly when crossing the threshold where PSOE wins the election,
suggesting that PSOE municipalities were not given any special treatment in the allocation of
funds.
Another potential issue regarding Plan E and the partisan alignment of the national gov-
ernment relates to the electoral return of Plan E. Insofar as Plan E was a national government
initiative we could be concerned that its electoral eects operated through changes in vote
shares in national (rather than municipal) elections. If this were the case, then it would be
unsurprising that we nd no targeting of supporters, because municipalities would simply be
unable to claim credit for the Plan E projects. However, census-area level regression results
reported in table B.5 show that areas receiving Plan E investment do not experience an appre-
ciable increase in the vote share of PSOE in the following election.18 All specications control
for the PSOE vote share in the previous 2008 national election and the set of controls used in
equation 1. Estimates of the eect of investments on subsequent electoral results are negative
and small. Receiving a projects is associated with a decrease of 0.25-0.38 percentage points in
the PSOE vote share in the following national elections. These estimates are extremely small
and statistically insignicant at conventional levels, and are evidence against the existence of
electoral returns accruing to the national government.
An additional explanation for not nding any supporter bias in the data could stem from the
diculty in measuring who directly benets from investment and to what extent they do so.
Because distances within cities are much smaller that distances between cities, benets arising
from investment projects allocated to a given neighbourhood may spill-over to other areas.
The existence of these spillovers is arguably a less severe problem in between-city studies. In
our analysis we have implicitly assumed that that the benets of receiving a Plan E project are
limited to the census area that receives it, hence ruling out spillovers to neighbouring areas.
However, it seems reasonable that at least some kinds of investments – such as gymnasiums,
cultural centres, or sports facilities – provide services that are enjoyed by a larger constituency.
Other investments, like a new sewage system, might even have negative externalities for the
closest neighbours but beneting the municipality as a whole.
To ensure that our results are robust to dierent assumptions regarding the localisation of
project benets are, we conduct two complementary robustness checks. To start, we perform
our analysis again by restricting our attention to types of projects for which benets can be
considered to be “strictly” localised, in the sense that these projects are more likely to benet
their immediate neighbours the most. To classify projects into this category, we use the de-
scriptions included in the original Plan E data source.19 Although this denition is somewhat
18Vote shares are in percentage points to facilitate the interpretation of the coecients.
19We specically restrict our attention to i) rehabilitation of public space and ii) improvement in public spaces
and road networks.
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arbitrary, some guidance on the selection of projects with localised benets is oered by the
literature on political budget cycles, which suggests that spending in parks and roads is very
prone to strategic manipulation because of its visibility among voters (see for example Knee-
bone and McKenzie 2001; Drazen and Eslava 2010; and Repetto 2017). Secondly, we retain our
initial catch-all denition of projects but we now allow benets to extend to 100 metre radius
circular buers around the actual project locations. Hence, if a project falls within a specic
census area A but less than 100 metres away from the boundary with another census area B we
consider both A and B to benet from this investment.
We then create our extensive and intensive bias measure using each of these alternative def-
initions and use them as dependent variables in an RDD analysis analogous to the one carried
out in section 4. Estimates for the bias measures created using the localised project benets
denition and the 100 metre buers are presented in table 4 in panels A and B, respectively.
Columns 1 and 2 report results for the extensive margin bias measure while columns 3 and 4
report the intensive margin. Following the approach in the previous section, we include both
full-sample results using third degree polynomials in the running variable (columns 1 and 3)
alongside local linear regressions with sample restricted to CCT bandwidths around the thresh-
old (columns 2 and 4), our preferred specication. We continue to nd small and insignicant
coecients. Most point estimates indicate eects of less than 1/20 of a standard deviation in the
bias measure in absolute values except in columns 3 and 4 of panel A, with slightly larger but
still insignicant coecients. Alternative specications using more lax denitions of localised
benets or narrower buer sizes (such as 25 or 50 metres) yield analogous conclusions and are
not reported for brevity. We interpret these estimates as showing that our main result is robust
to dierent assumptions about the reach of spatial benets of local investment.
An alternative explanation for nding no supporter bias is related to whether investment
projects are relevant to voters at the local level. If voters do not associate projects with the
municipal government, or are simply unaected by them, local politicians would have little in-
centive to favour their supporters. As a consequence, we should observe no response of voters
to investment in the ballot box. However, we nd that there is at least one margin through
which voters respond to project allocations. Specically, there is at least suggestive evidence
that voters respond to projects in terms of an increase in turnout, as shown in panel B of table
B.5 in the appendix. Results are obtained by estimating census-area level regressions of 2011
municipal election turnout on a measure of investment, 2007 turnout, municipal xed eects,
and the same set of controls used in our baseline specication. Investment is either measured
as a project indicator, taking value 1 if a section received a Plan E project, or as total project
cost per capita, measured at the census area level and standardized. For both investment mea-
sure we nd a positive eect on turnout in response to Plan E investments. The coecients
are relatively small but strongly signicant, with receiving a project being associated with an
increase in turnout of almost 0.4 percentage points. We interpret this result as suggesting that
voters become more sensitive to the local level political agenda when observing the actual poli-
cies taking place. It is also evidence that projects have local electoral eects. Placebo estimates
reported in gure B.7 in the appendix validate the empirical strategy pursued to obtain these
estimates by showing that there is no eect of investment on previous municipal elections’
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turnout.
A complementary result shows further evidence of local benets of Plan E investments.
Table B.6 in the appendix reports results regressing, respectively, a project indicator and the
total project cost per capita (in logarithms to facilitate interpretation) on the log of census
area population.20 We nd a strong and statistically signicant correlation between popula-
tion and allocation decisions. While this may seem obvious at rst glance, it illustrates that
local politicians are mindful of allocating projects to populated areas, presumably to maximize
visibility and impact of these forms of spending. Recall that residential density, the pattern
of urban development (obtained from remote-sensing from Corine land cover) and distance to
the municipal centroid are included as controls. Hence, we are, at least partially, accounting
for dierences in the built environment that could inuence investment demand and bias our
estimates.
Another possible mechanism behind our result is that local politicians may lack the sophis-
tication or the knowledge needed to use investment strategically. National-level politicians,
who typically handle larger budgets and more professionalized bureaucracies, may be more
experienced and skilled, and hence more aware of the possible benets of engaging in distribu-
tive politics. This could explain why previous research found alignment eects between the
national and municipal government but we nd no eect within the municipality. While we
cannot directly rule out this possibility, under the assumption that politicians are more sophis-
ticated in larger municipalities, we can use a sample split to further investigate this hypothesis.
Panels C and D of table 4 replicate our RDD analysis splitting the sample between large and
small municipalities, respectively. In order to preserve the signicance of the rst stage, we
split the sample at the relatively low threshold of 3,000 inhabitants, which roughly corresponds
to the rst quartile of the municipal population distribution. Interestingly, the estimates remain
small and indistinguishably dierent from zero both in large and in small municipalities. One
could be concerned that our sample split fails to properly sort municipalities with respect to the
sophistication of their local politicians. However, alternative empirical analyses using census-
area regressions including the incumbent’s vote share and focusing on province capitals also
lead to similar qualitative results.21
A nal possibility relates to dierent theories on the targets of distributive policies. Our
hypothesis that politicians disproportionately target their supporters with investment is closely
related to the core voters hypothesis in the political economy and political science literature
(Cox and McCubbins, 1986). An alternative hypothesis poses that politicians should instead
target swing voters, that is, voters with weak party preferences who may be willing to “switch
sides” in response to economic favours (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Dixit and Londregan, 1995).
However, it is generally dicult to identify swing voters from electoral data alone.22 While we
show that local governments are not targeting their supporters, we cannot rule out that they
target swing voters instead.
20As before, we include the same controls used in the baseline specication and municipal xed eects.
21The interested reader can refer to Table B.11 of the previous working paper version of this paper (Carozzi and
Repetto 2017).
22For an exception in this regard see Dahlberg and Johansson (2002).
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6. Conclusions
Local governments carry out a large share of public investment which, in turn, has long-
standing eects on our cities and towns. In this paper we study whether the allocation of
investment within cities is aected by the spatial distribution of voter support. Between 2009
and 2011, the Spanish government carried out a large scale stimulus program that transferred 12
billion Euros to municipalities to increase infrastructure spending and foster employment. This
policy is well-suited to analyse how local politicians distribute resources inside municipalities.
We nd that the spatial allocation of spending within municipalities is not aected by the
geography of political support. This result is robust to allowing investment to have a disperse
spatial impact, to focusing only on those investment projects that are more likely to yield lo-
calised benets, and to dierent ways of measuring supporter bias. We therefore conclude that
previous evidence of tactical distribution of resources between levels of government does not
carry over when translating the analysis to groups of voters. Our nding is consistent with the
notion that alignment eects are more closely related with targeting of aligned institutions (mu-
nicipalities, states, districts) rather than aligned voters or supporters. Complementary results
show that areas receiving an investment project experience an increase in turnout, suggesting
that spending might be a way to persuade voters to participate in local elections.
Our results contribute to the still very incomplete understanding of how electoral conditions
and incentives shape the allocation of investments within the city. Despite the importance of
local investment on national spending, the lack of data at a suciently disaggregated level
has hampered the study of these issues. Our paper is a rst step towards uncovering how
distributive politics operate at the very local level. Further understanding of the determinants
of local investment decisions remains an open topic for future research.
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Appendix
Appendix A. Data sources
Municipality codes and names; population
To have a reliable list of municipality names and ocial municipality and province codes,
we use the INE list of all Spanish municipalities for the years 2001-2011.
URL: http://www.ine.es/daco/daco42/codmun/codmun11/11codmunmapa.htm
Population data at the municipal level is available from 1996 onwards at the Padrón continuo
municipal de habitantes:
URL: http://www.ine.es/dynt3/inebase/es/index.html?padre=517&dh=1
Census area maps (shapeles)
To be able to connect electoral data (available at the census area level) and the investment
projects (geolocated with latitude and longitude), we need shapeles with the borders of each
census area. Since boundaries usually change over time, we need to have updated maps for
each municipal election year (2007 and 2011) before and after the Plan E investment program.
The 2011 shapele with all census areas is freely available at the following url:
URL: http://www.ine.es/censos2011_datos/cen11_datos_resultados_seccen.htm
We also purchased the map for 2007 directly from INE, which we use as a reference in all
the empirical analysis. In order to be able to assign the data from the 2001 Census to the 2007
census areas, we also bought the shapele map for 2001 from the same source.
Plan E Investment data
The Plan E data on investment projects with geographical coordinates and amount were
downloaded by hand from:
URL: http://www.seap.minhap.gob.es/fondosinversionlocal/utilidades/geolocalizacion-de-
proyectos.html
and saved as a .csv directly. Each investment project comes with, among other variables, the
geographical coordinates. Those coordinates are then used, together with the 2007 shapele, in
ArcGIS to overlay the investment project data (as a “point layer”) with the census area polygons
as described below.
Electoral data
The electoral data are at the "Mesa" level (= polling stations, within-municipality) for several
municipal and national elections. Data are then aggregated at the census area level in order to
have the same level of aggregation of the shapeles and the Census data. Each census area
usually contains just a handful of polling stations, so the amount of aggregation is minimal.
URL: http://www.infoelectoral.interior.es/min/areaDescarga.html?method=search
There, we downloaded electoral results for the 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011 municipal election,
plus the 2000, 2004 and 2008 national elections, both at the disaggregated “mesa” level and at
the municipal level.
Those data lack information on the identity of the mayor in each year and on the corre-
sponding party in power, so we obtain such information using data from
URL: http://www.seap.minhap.gob.es/en/web/areas/politica_local/sistema_de_informacion_local_-
SIL-/datos_legislaturas_1979_2015.html
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Census area data We downloaded some variables, used as controls in the empirical anal-
ysis, from the 2001 Population census directly from the INE website:
URL: http://www.ine.es/censo/es/inicio.jsp
We obtain population data at the census area level for 2007 and 2011 from:
URL: http://www.ine.es/jaxi/menu.do?type=pcaxis&path=/t20/e245/&le=inebase&L=0
Finally, we obtain information from Corine Land cover on the fraction of urban discontin-
uous terrain from:
URL: http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/data/clc-2006-vector-data-version-6
Data restrictions
Our nal dataset is based on the 2007 census areas for which we have information on the ge-
ographical boundaries (and coordinates). These areas are those that appear in the 2007 shapele
from INE. Of the 35,323 census areas in this dataset, we drop 5,833 belonging to municipalities
with only one census area. Then, we drop municipalities where the mayor does not belong
to any of the 9 largest parties, as dened in section 3 in the main text. By doing this, we lose
1,405 additional areas. Finally, we drop the municipality of “"Mañón”, because there is a conict
between the map – which has it divided in two census areas – and the electoral data, where it
appears as having just one.
Regarding the projects data, the original data has 57,850 of them but 15,682 of them are
incorrectly geo-located. We drop 6,574 projects that have no localised benets, such as those
related to modernization of the electronic equipment of municipal buildings or to sewage works.
With the help of a research assistant, we went through all the remaining projects with incorrect
geo-coding and we were able to hand-code roughly one-fth of them. ArcGIS is used to assign
all the 38,353 correctly geo-localised projects (which are points with geographical coordinates)
to census areas (areas with polygon boundaries).
After this step, we have a dataset at the census area level. We replace all the Plan E vari-
ables (such as the dummy for receiving at least one project) with zeros if a given census area
did not receive any project. In the special case in which we observe, in our sample, that the
whole municipality carried out no investment projects at all, we replace all variables as missing
instead. This is the case for only 28 municipalities. Given that the cost per capita variable has
some large outliers, we replace as missing all observations in the top 1% of the cost per capita
distribution when constructing our extensive bias measure.
Construction of the nal dataset
The basis of our dataset are the 35,323 census areas in which Spain was divided as of 2007,
as they appear in the INE shapele. To assign investment projects – which come with latitude
and longitude – to census areas we need information on the exact boundaries of each area,
obtained from a shapele for all 2007 census areas. Using ArcGIS 10.3.1, we overlay the point
layer (that is, the dataset of geolocated project points) to the map of census areas. ArcGIS then
calculates how many project points fall into each census areas, and the total cost. Finally, it
saves the resulting dataset as a comma-separated values le that can be read by STATA.
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The electoral data for 2007 are then directly merged using a unique census area identier
(labelled CUSEC in the raw data) to the main dataset. A slight complication arises when one
tries to merge information for other years (such as, for instance, the 2001 Population Census
data or electoral data for other years) to the 2007 census area dataset, because the boundaries
of the census areas change over time. To be able to merge data from other years with the 2007
dataset, we create, for each year in which a map shapele is available (2001 and 2011), a dataset
that links the census areas boundaries to the 2007 ones. These two datasets allow us to directly
link data for 2001 and 2011 to the 2007 census areas.
As an illustration on how census areas are linked across dierent years, consider the case in
which the 2001 census area A is divided in two areas in 2007, B with surface 9/10 of the original
one, and C with surface 1/10. Imagine that we want to have the variable “number of foreigners”,
only available for 2001, for all the 2007 census areas. Assume, for the sake of the example, that
the number of foreigners living in area A was 100 in 2001. To assign this number to the new
2007 boundaries, we simply assume that those people are uniformly located in space. Hence,
we assign 90 of them to area B and the remaining 10 to area C .23 This simple procedure allows
us to obtain a single cross-section for the 2007 census areas with several variables from other
years, with the advantage of having kept the geographical boundaries xed.
23For the years in which no shapele is available, we rst merge to the closest year available and then apply
the described procedure.
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Appendix B. Additional results
This appendix includes a set of descriptives and complementary results - in the forms of
gures, tables and images - which we are referred to in the paper. Table B.1 shows descriptive
statistics at the municipal level.
Table B.1
Descriptive statistics - Municipal level
Mean Std. dev. Min Max
PSOE mayor 0.50 0.50 0.000 1.000
PP mayor 0.33 0.47 0.000 1.000
N. of census areas 13.72 70.29 2.000 2381.000
Seats in the municipal council 14.25 4.74 9.000 57.000
Plan E spending, per capita 207.05 71.42 0.000 303.681
Unemployment in 2007 0.07 0.03 0.012 0.228
Unemployment in 2008 0.10 0.03 0.020 0.280
Unemployment in 2009 0.12 0.04 0.017 0.309
Unemployment in 2010 0.12 0.04 0.022 0.332
Unemployment in 2011 0.14 0.05 0.027 0.349
Population 19,527 89852 1099 3132463
Observations 2046
Notes: Averages for some municipal-level characteristics of interest for the 2,046 municipalities in the sample.
Electoral gures refer to the 2007 municipal election. Due to lack of municipal information on active population
at the municipal level, unemployment is calculated as number of registered unemployed divided by the population
aged 15-65.
Table B.2
Descriptives Statistics for Investment Projects
All FEIL FEESL CN
A. All projects
Cost in million euros 12308 7933 4232 143
Participating municipalities 8097 8058 8067 713
Average cost of a project (thousand EUR) 213 260 168 69
N. of projects 57850 30566 25214 2070
B. Only correctly geocoded projects
Cost in million euros 9376 6270 3106
Participating municipalities 7210 6879 8023
Average cost of a project (thousand EUR) 244 292 184
N. of projects 38353 21460 16893
Notes: Descriptive statistics for investment projects. Panel A uses the universe of Plan E projects and Panel B
restricts attention to projects with correct geo-location in our sample.
Table B.2 presents descriptives for all projects and projects in our sample, respectively. The
dierence between the two samples corresponds to projects for which geo-coding is not avail-
able and projects which we exclude because they clearly yield no geographically precise eect
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on voters (for instance, improvements to the city hall internet connection, etc.). In our sample
we also drop all projects of the CN investment program, because it was a plan meant to dis-
tribute resources to provincial rather than municipal authorities. Likewise, we exclude projects
executed by associations of municipalities as we cannot attribute a single incumbent party to
these associations. We have a total of 38,353 correctly geocoded projects roughly equally di-
vided between the two Plan E programs (FEIL and FEESL). Our sample of correctly geocoded
projects covers 7,210 municipalities (90% of the total). The average project costs 244 thousand
Euros, with projects being more costly in FEIL than FEESL. Comparing panels A and B of Table
B.2 we can note that projects that are not in our sample are slightly cheaper on average.
Table B.3 presents rst-stage estimates corresponding to equation 1. In the rst two columns
we use the whole sample and include in estimation a third-degree polynomial in the winning
margin, while in the last two we restrict the sample to observations within the Calonico, Catta-
neo and Titiunik (2014) optimal bandwidth and use a linear control function. Each observation
is weighted by the inverse of the number of census areas in the municipality so that all mu-
nicipalities have the same weight. Columns 2 and 4 also include the set of controls outlined in
section 4. We observe in all columns that when PSOE wins a seat majority by a narrow margin
there is a 30 - 38% increase in the probability of having a PSOE mayor. Note that this jump is
similar to the one observed in gure 3 in the paper.
Table B.3
First-Stage Regressions
Full sample CCT bandwidth
PSOE seats majority 0.312*** 0.307*** 0.380*** 0.372***
(0.052) (0.052) (0.053) (0.053)
Controls N Y N Y
F-statistic 36.11 35.15 50.90 49.42
Obs. 28043 28031 13315 13314
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator taking value 1 if a municipality has a PSOE mayor. Main independent
variable of interest is a dummy taking value 1 if the PSOE winning margin is positive. All specications control
for the vote share distance to PSOE seat majority in the 2007 municipal elections. Columns 1 and 2 use the full
sample and third degree polynomials, allowed to dier at either side of the threshold. Columns 3 and 4 restrict the
sample to a bandwidth around the threshold estimated as in Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) and includes
a linear control function in the winning margin, with slope allowed to dier on either side of the threshold.
Figure B.6 and table B.4 present the balance on covariates results as discussed in section 4.
Table B.5 presents estimates regarding the electoral impact of Plan E projects. These are
obtained using census area level regressions with municipal xed eects. For example, Panel
A presents estimates for the following OLS regression:
PSOE V sh2011cm = βIcm + PSOE V sh
2008
cm + αm + γ
′Xcm + cm
where c indicates census areas and m indexes municipalities. PSOE V shyrcm is the vote
share of PSOE in the national elections in census area c and municipality m, measured in per-
centage points. Icm is a measure of Plan E investment which can be either a project dummy
32
Figure B.6
Balance of covariates checks
Notes: Balancing checks for each covariate used in the RDD estimation. Dots are averages within intervals of 1%
of the winning margin, calculated weighting each observation by the inverse of the number of sections in each
municipality. Solid lines represent tted values from a local polynomial smooth regression estimated with an
Epanechnikov kernel and bandwidth calculated using Silverman’s rule-of-thumb.
(column 1) or investment per capita (column 2), both measured at the census area level. The
xed eect αm controls for municipal characteristics. The set of controlsXcm is the same as the
one used in equation 2 of section 4. Finally cm is an error term potentially correlated within
municipalities. In this way we investigate the electoral eects of Plan E investments by using
within municipal variation and previous electoral results. The estimates reported in panel B
of table B.5 are obtained from a similar regression replacing PSOE V shyrcm with Turnoutyrcm
which measures turnout in the corresponding municipal election (in this case 2011 and 2007,
respectively). Results indicate a small but positive and signicant eect of projects on electoral
turnout. Figure B.7 presents these estimates alongside placebos obtained from replacing the
original outcome variable Turnout2011cm with turnout levels before the onset of Plan E. We nd
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Table B.4
Regression results for the balance of covariates
Population Surface Density Crime Unemployed No green
PSOE mayor 0.050 -2.386 1.864* 0.013 0.008 -0.018
(0.040) (5.737) (1.090) (0.013) (0.012) (0.025)
R2 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Observations 13314 13315 13314 13315 13315 13315
Homeowners Foreigners College ed. Aged 0-16 Aged 16-64 Aged 65+
PSOE mayor -0.014 -0.003 0.004 -0.002 0.008 -0.006
(0.010) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008)
R2 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
Observations 13315 13315 13315 13315 13315 13315
Notes: Coecients are the estimated jumps in each covariate at the threshold of winning margin equal to zero,
using a local linear regression with bandwidth equal to 9.6% at each side, chosen applying the Calonico, Cattaneo
and Titiunik (2014) method on equation 2 using the extensive bias measure. Population is in logarithms, surface in
km2, density in thousands of inhabitants/km2, and the rest of the variables are fractions at the census area level.
Results using dierent bandwidths are analogous. S.e. clustered at the municipality level.
that in these cases the estimates are smaller in absolute value and statistically indistinguishable
from 0, as expected.
Results reported in table B.6 indicate that more populated areas within a municipality re-
ceive more projects. To show this, we estimate census area level regressions of measures of
investment (a project dummy and log total investment, respectively) on a municipal xed ef-
fect, the log of population and our set of controls. The table reports the log population coef-
cients. For both investment measures we nd strong and signicant eects of population on
the probability of receiving a project (column 1) and on total investment (column 2). Column
1 indicates that areas with 1% larger populations have 0.18% more probability of receiving a
project. The estimate in column 2, obtained using only census areas receiving projects, show
that a 1% increase in population is associated with 0.33% more spending.
Finally, gure B.8 displays a reduced-form RDD plot using municipal Plan E funds per capita
as our outcome variable. We can observe from the graph that there is no discontinuity in the
amount of received Plan E funds when comparing municipalities where PSOE narrowly lost
a majority with municipalities where PSOE narrowly won. We only report this reduced form
graph for ease of exposition but fuzzy-RD estimates adjusting for the jump in the rst stage
also lead to very small and insignicant coecients.
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Figure B.7
Turnout Effect and Placebos
−.3
−.1
.1
.3
.5
E
ff
e
c
t 
o
f 
1
+
 p
r
o
je
c
ts
 o
n
 t
u
r
n
o
u
t 
(%
)
2011 2003 1999
Notes: The gure plots the coecients and condence intervals of a census area level regression of turnout in
the dierent municipal elections on a project dummy, alongside a set of controls including 2007 turnout and a
municipal level xed eect. Standard errors used to create condence intervals are clustered at the municipal
level.
Figure B.8
No Difference in Plan E Take-up
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Notes: The vertical axis measures the amount of Plan E funding per capita received by a municipality. Horizontal
axis measures PSOE Winning Margin calculated following the method outlined in section 4.1. Dots represent
averages within 1% bins of the winning margin. The lines are local linear regression estimates obtained using an
Epanechnikov kernel with bandwidth calculated using Silverman’s rule-of-thumb.
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Table B.5
Complementary Results
(1) (2)
PSOE share 2011 PSOE share 2011
A. National PSOE Vote Share
Project 1/0 -0.038
(0.048)
Inv. p.c. -0.025
(0.018)
PSOE share 2008 0.729*** 0.729***
(0.016) (0.016)
Controls FE + ctrls. FE + ctrls.
R2 0.94 0.94
Observations 27823 27487
Turnout 2011 Turnout 2011
B. Turnout Eects
Project 1/0 0.388***
(0.07)
Inv. p.c. 0.113***
(0.03)
Turnout 2007 0.309*** 0.312***
(0.02) (0.02)
Controls FE + ctrls. FE + ctrls.
R2 0.88 0.88
Observations 27880 27544
Notes: Census area level regressions including municipal xed eects in all columns. In panel A, the outcome
variable is the vote share of PSOE in the 2011 national elections and all specications control for PSOE vote shares
in the 2008 national elections (before Plan E took place). In panel B, the outcome variable is 2011 municipal election
turnout and all specications control for the 2007 turnout in municipal elections. Standard errors clustered at the
municipal level in all specications.
Table B.6
Project Allocation & Census Area Population
Project 1/0 Log(Investment)
Log population (2007) 0.185*** 0.334***
(0.014) (0.049)
Controls FE + ctrls. FE + ctrls.
R2 0.33 0.26
Observations 27925 11268
Notes: Census area level regressions including municipal xed eects in all specications. In column 1 the depen-
dent variable is a dummy taking value 1 if the census area received a Plan E project. In column 2 the dependent
variable is the log of the total investment received, excluding census areas receiving no projects. Both columns
include the set of controls described in section 4. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level.
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Figure B.9
Examples of Plan E Investments
Restoration and accessibility improvement in nearby streets in the urban spaces around Eresma, Toro and Tormes
streets in the municipality of Leganés, south of Madrid. The total cost of this project was € 3,200,000, nanced by
Plan E through FEIL.
Environmental adaptation and improvement in the low areas of Barrio del Villablanca, in the municipality of
Almería, in Southern Spain. The total cost of this project was € 4,864,380 nanced by Plan E through FEESL.
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Figure B.10
Plan E Signboard template
Notes: Signboard template for Plan E projects. From top to bottom, the signboard must contain: name of the
municipality, the contractor, and the project; the amount spent and the expected completion time; a Plan E logo;
the government logo.
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